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Efficiency Inducing Taxation for
Polluting Oligopolists*
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Résumé / Abstract
Règle de taxation permettant de réaliser l'optimalité pour un oligopole
polluant. On considère une industrie oligopolistique dans laquelle la production
s'accompagne d'émissions de pollution qui s'accumule pour former un stock. Dans
ce modèle, les firmes se livrent une concurrence à la Cournot. Le gouvernement
propose une règle de taxation pour corriger à la fois l'effet de la concurrence
imparfaite et l'externalité négative due aux émissions de pollution. On montre qu'il
existe une règle de taxation qui ne dépend pas explicitement du temps et qui amène
les firmes à choisir le sentier de production socialement optimal. Le taux optimal de
taxation d'unité de production dépend du niveau du stock de pollution et peut être
négatif (une subvention) pour des niveaux faibles du stock de pollution. On obtient
un résultat qui peut sembler surprenant à première vue: il peut être optimal de
subventionner la production pour au moins une période de temps, même si la
production de la situation de laisser-faire (sans intervention) est à chaque instant
au dessus du niveau de production socialement optimal. Malgré la subvention, les
firmes réduisent leur production par rapport à la situation de laisser-faire afin de
prolonger la période de subvention et retarder le moment o\`u la subvention se
transformerait en taxe. 
We derive corrective tax rules when firms are oligopolists whose
production processes generate emissions that add to a stock of pollution that
accumulates over time. In our model, firms play dynamic Cournot games among
themselves, and the government designs a tax rule that corrects for both the
externality associated with emissions and the market power of oligopolists. We
show that there exists a time-independent tax rule that guides the oligopolists to
achieve the socially optimum production path. The optimal tax per unit of output
is dependent on the current level of the pollution stock, and it may be negative
(implying a subsidy) when the pollution stock is low. We obtain a rather
surprising result: in some cases, the optimal tax rule gives firms a subsidy for an
initial time interval even though under laissez-faire their output exceeds the
socially optimal output at each point of time. This subsidy, however, induces firms
to produce less than they would under laissez-faire, because they know that if
they produce more then the subsidy will be reduced in the future and/or will soon
turn into a tax.
Mots Clés : Pollution, oligopole, taxation, incitation, jeux dynamiques
Keywords : Pollution, oligopoly, taxation, incentive, dynamic games
JEL : H41, L51, Q25
1 Introduction
When rms' production process generates pollutants as a byproduct,
this externality must be corrected. Among the methods of correction
advocated by economists are (i) imposing pollution standards, (ii) tax-
ing polluting rms, (iii) requiring rms to buy pollution permits, (iv)
relying on bargaining between the rms and the injured party, and (v)
threat of litigations. All these methods have well- known advantages
as well as drawbacks. For example, an oligopolist might purchase all
or most of the permits, thus improving its market share and possibly
leading to monopolisation of the industry
1
. Bargaining and litigations
may involve considerable transaction costs. Taxation and standards may
require information that the regulator does not possess.
In this paper, we do not take a position on the choice of policy in-
struments. Our aim is to characterize the optimal tax rule when the
emission of pollutants by rms causes present as well as future damages
because the stock of pollution accumulates over time. Specically, we
assume that rms are oligopolists, so that each rm does realize that
the future actions of its rivals depend on its own present action. Firms
maximize their long-run prot, anticipating both the actions of their
rivals, and the future tax rates that reect future environmental dam-
ages. We are able to show that even if rms play dynamic games among
themselves, it is possible to construct tax rules that achieve eciency.
By considering the taxing of polluting oligopolists in a dynamic context,
we depart from the static oligopoly framework used in Katsoulacos and
Xepapadeas (1992) and Kennedy (1994).
The optimum tax rule must send to rms the message that the more
they pollute now, the higher will be their future tax liability. The pa-
rameters of the tax rule, however, depend on how rms interact with
each other in a dynamic Nash equilibrium: they may play an open-
loop game, or a closed-loop game. This distinction will be explained
below. We show that in both cases, there exists a corresponding time-
independent tax rule that guides the oligopolists to achieve the socially
optimum time paths of production and pollution. The optimal tax per
unit of output is dependent on the current level of the pollution stock,
and it may be negative (implying a subsidy) when the pollution stock
is low. We obtain a result that might at rst seem puzzling: in some
cases, under the optimal tax rule, rms receive a subsidy for some initial
time interval even though under laissez-faire their output exceeds the
1
See Newbery (1990, pp. 344-345), von der Fehr (1993), Sartzetakis (1996), Long
and Soubeyran (1997), among others. Laont and Tirole (1996a,b) address some
asymmetric information issues associated with pollution permits.
1
socially optimal output at each point of time. This subsidy, however, in-
duces rms to produce less than they would under laissez-faire, because
they know that if they produce more then the subsidy will be reduced
in the future and/or will soon turn into a tax. Upon reection, this is
an instance of \ the carrot and the stick" policies.
The literature on regulating (or taxing) rms in a dynamic context
consists mainly of two streams. The rst one focuses on informational
issue without paying much attention to the problem of stock accumula-
tion
2
. The second stream deals with stock dynamics and assume per-
fect information
3
. In addition, there are a few articles that link the
two streams
4
. The present paper belongs to the second stream. In its
concern with eciency-inducing taxation, it is inspired by the models of
Bergstrom, Cross and Porter (1981)- to be referred to as BCP- and Karp
and Livernois (1992, 1994). BCP deal with the design of a tax scheme in
the case of a monopoly that exploits an exhaustible resource. They de-
rive an intuitively appealing family of tax/subsidy schedules that ensure
ecient output level. Karp and Livernois (1992) show that the BCP
rules, being time-dependent, are subject to strategic manipulation by
the monopolist if the government is unable to commit to the entire se-
quence of tax rates. In other words, the BCP tax rules are not subgame
perfect. Karp and Livernois (1992) propose instead a linear Markov per-
fect (LMP) tax rule which ensures subgame perfection and induces the
monopolist to produce the ecient output level.
The case of oligopoly is more complicated, because of intertemporal
strategic interaction among rms. The only dynamic model of a pollut-
ing oligopoly that we are aware of is Karp and Livernois (1994). They
restrict attention to the case in which the regulator does not seek to
maximize welfare, but only aims at reducing aggregate emissions to an
2
See Baron (1989), Besanko and Sappington (1987) on the designs of regulatary
mechanisms under limited information (i.e. there is at least one variable that the reg-
ulator cannot observe) using the revelation principle, which is central to such designs.
Laont and Tirole (1988) show that when there is learning (informational dynamics)
the revelation principle breaks down in the absence of commitment. Sappington and
Sibley (1988) show that if prots can be observed with one-period lag, then using
the incremental surplus subsidy (ISS) scheme, the regulator can induce a monopolist
to produce the ecient output level even if the regulator does not know the rm's
cost function. In the case of a monopolist that extracts from a stock of exhaustible
resource, Karp and Livernois (1992) show that ISS must be supplemented by an exit
tax.
3
For regulating a monopoly, see Bergstrom, Cross and Porter (1981), and the
rst part of Karp and Livernois (1992). Farzin (1996) addresses dynamic aspects of
pollution tax under the assumption of perfect competition.
4
See Karp and Livernois (1992), (1994), Gaudet, Lassere and Long (1995, 1996a,
1996b).
2
exogenously specied target level. Furthermore, in their model there is
no stock of pollution; the state variable in the model is the tax rate
that gets adjusted when actual emission diers from the target level.
Our model is dierent in two respects: rst, the government seeks to
induce the ecient time path of pollution; second, the stock of pollu-
tion accumulates with emissions. By having the tax rate conditioned on
the stock of pollution, our model has more on common with Karp and
Livernois (1992), but that paper deals with a monopolist extracting a
non-renewable resource while we are concerned with an oligopoly that
impacts on a renewable resource (the quality of the environment); this
oligopolistic struture introduces new strategic elements. On the other
hand, we assume perfect information, while Karp and Livernois (1992)
also consider the case of imperfect information.
Before deriving the optimal tax rule, we start with the case where
the government announces from the outset an arbitrary tax rule, and we
show how rms respond to this tax rule while playing a non-cooperative
game among themselves.We focus on linear Markov tax rule, that is,
the tax bill at any time t depends only on the current levels of output
and pollution stock, and it is linear in the rm's output, though not
necessarily linear in the pollution stock.
We study two types of equilibria, which dier on the information
rms use to condition their actions. In the open-loop Nash equilibrium
(OLNE), each rm chooses, right at the beginning of the game, its time
path of production (and hence emission), taking as given the time paths
chosen by other rms. In the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE),
each rm chooses a feedback strategy, that is, a decision rule which
conditions its output at any time t on the level of the pollution stock
observed at that time
5
. Both types of equilibria are time-consistent, in
the sense that if all rms follow their strategies, then at each point in
time no rm will have an incentive to deviate. A requirement that is
stronger than time-consistency is `subgame perfection'. It is known that
the MPNE is subgame perfect but the OLNE is not
6
.
While subgame perfection is a very important criterion for equilib-
rium selection, especially because it eliminates Nash equilibria that are
made possible only by non-credible threats, this does not mean that
OLNE should be discarded. In many simultaneous-move games where
agents are symmetric (such as the oligopoly game considered here), `un-
reasonable' equilibria brought about by non-credible threats do not arise.
5
This structure is often referred to as the closed-loop information structure; see
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Sections 4.7 and 13.3), for further discussion.
6
For further explanation of these concepts and several interesting examples, see
Karp and Newbery (1993).
3
Furthermore, as Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p.131) point out, OLNE
\serve as a useful benchmark for discussing the eects of strategic incen-
tives in the closed-loop information structure."
In this paper, we compare the OLNE with the MPNE, and show
that the optimal tax rules in the two equilibria take similar forms, but
with dierent parameter values. In both cases, the rst best pollution
path is shown to be achievable by an appropriate linear Markov tax rule.
The correct parameters for the tax rules depend on whether rms choose
open-loop or Markov strategies. Thus our results indicate that informa-
tional problems facing the government are not restricted to the task of
nding out the true damage function, demand curve and cost parame-
ters; the government must also nd out whether rms use open-loop or
Markov strategies, or perhaps guide rms in their choice of strategies.
In Section 2, we describe the basic model and characterize the social
optimum. The corrective tax rules are derived in Sections 3 and 4 for
the open-loop and feedback cases respectively. Section 5 oers some nal
remarks.
2 The Basic Model
We consider an oligopoly consisting of n identical rms that produce a
homogeneous good. Each rm has a constant unit cost c  0. Let q
i
denote rm i's output. Industry output is Q =
P
q
i
and the inverse
demand function is P = P (Q), with P
0
< 0 and P (0) > c. The amount
of pollutant emitted by rm i is e
i
= q
i
where  > 0. Without loss
of generality, we set  = 1. Let S  0 denote the stock of pollution.
Following Forster (1973) we assume that the dynamics of the pollution
stock obeys the law
_
S(t) = Q(t)  S(t) (1)
where  > 0 is rate of decay of the pollution stock.
The social welfare at time t is assumed to be of the separable form
W (t) = U(Q(t))  cQ(t)  D(S(t)) (2)
where D(S)  0 is the damage function representing the harm caused
by the stock of pollution. The parameter   0 allows us to do com-
parative statics and to consider the polar case where the pollution does
not aect welfare, i.e.  = 0. We take U(Q) to be the area under the
demand curve:
U(Q) =
Z
Q
0
P (Z)dZ
4
It is assumed that the function D(S) is strictly convex, and that the
marginal damage is negligible if the stock of pollution is zero:
D(0) = 0; D
0
(0) = 0; D
0
(S) > 0 for S > 0; D
00
(S) > 0:
As we will see below, this assumption ensures that there is a unique
and positive steady state level of pollution under the central planning
scenario.
The aggregate welfare is dened as the integral of the discounted
stream of W (t):
V =
Z
1
0
W (t)e
 rt
dt (3)
where r > 0 is the rate of discount.
The Social Optimum
Before describing the behaviour of rms, let us nd out what is the
optimum solution if rms can be directly controlled by a benevolent `so-
cial planner'. This, of course, is only a theoretical benchmark case, and
should not be taken as our endorsement of direct control of production
by any central agency. The social planner chooses the time path of the
industry output, Q(t), so as to maximize (3) subject to
_
S = Q  S and
the given initial condition S(0) = S
0
. This is a standard optimal control
problem with an innite horizon
7
. Let  denote the shadow price of the
pollution stock. It will be shown that  is negative along the optimal
path. The necessary conditions are
P (Q)  c+   0; Q [P (Q)  c+ ] = 0 (4)
_
 = ( + r) + D
0
(S) (5)
_
S = Q  S (6)
and the transversality condition is
lim
t!1
e
 rt
 (t)S(t) = 0 (7)
When Q is strictly positive, (4) and (5) yield the following condition
P
0
(Q)
_
Q =  
_
 = (r + )[P (Q)  c]  D
0
(S) (8)
7
See, for example, Leonard and Long (1992) for the solution techniques for this
type of optimal control problems.
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From (6) and (8) the steady state can be determined. There exists a
unique optimal steady state level of the pollution stock, denoted by
b
S
1
,
and a corresponding steady state output level
b
Q
1
= 
b
S
1
(9)
where
b
S
1
satises the following equation
P


b
S
1

= c+
D
0

b
S
1

r + 
(10)
This condition says that, at the steady state, the consumers' valuation of
the marginal unit of output must be equal to its production cost plus the
present value of the stream of marginal damage caused by the additional
pollution generated by it.
It can be shown that, starting with any initial pollution stock S
0
<
b
S
1
the optimal time path of S is monotone increasing, approaching
b
S
1
as t tends to innity. The associated time path of production Q(t) is
positive and monotone decreasing
8
if  > 0, approaching Q
1
asymp-
totically. If S
0
>
b
S
1
then the optimal time path of S is monotone
decreasing and Q is monotone increasing except possibly for some initial
time interval where there is no production, and this happens only if S
0
is very great, say S
0
> S where S is a large number. It follows that
for all initial condition S
0
 0 the optimal output at any time t can be
expressed as a function of the optimal stock level S at t. We denote this
functional relationship, for all S  0, as Q =
b
Q(S)  0, with
b
Q
0
(S) < 0 if S < S and  > 0;
b
Q(S) = 0 if S  S (11)
b
Q

b
S
1

= 
b
S
1
(12)
This functional relationship will be referred to as the `feedback control
rule'. It describes the optimal control rule in the feedback form: given the
current level of the stock, the optimal current production Q is uniquely
determined
9
.
The linear-quadratic case
Consider the special case where the function P (Q) is linear and the
function D(S) is quadratic,
P (Q) = P (0)  bQ; P (0)  c  a > 0 (13)
8
If  = 0 then Q(t) is constant over the whole time horizon.
9
Technically, the function Q(S) thus described represents the stable branch of the
saddle-point in the (Q;S) phase diagram.
6
and
D(S) =
S
2
2
for S  0;  > 0 (14)
The steady state is
b
S
1
=
a(r + )
(r + )b + 
(15)
And the feedback control rule
b
Q(S) can be shown to be linear and de-
creasing in S:
b
Q(S) =
b
Q
1
+ [S  
b
S
1
] = S + (   )
b
S
1
(16)
where  is a negative root of the quadratic equation

2
  (r + 2)  (=b) = 0 (17)
Remark: Strictly speaking, (16) holds only for 0  S  S, where
S =
b
S
1
 
b
Q
1

>
b
S
1
and
b
Q = 0 is S > S.
Oligopolistic Behavior
We now return to the market economy scenario. Firms are not sub-
ject to direct control from a central government agency. They are free to
choose their output levels. However they have to pay taxes. We restrict
attention to the case where each rm's tax bill at time t is a function of
its current output level q
i
(t) and of the size of the pollution stock S(t).
Furthermore, we assume that \equals must be treated equally": all rms
face the same tax rule
10
:We denote rm i's tax bill at time t by
T
i
= T (S(t); q
i
(t)) (18)
where the functional form T (:; :) is the same for all rms. This tax rule
contains S as an argument because we would expect the government to
want rms to internalize the social cost they cause by their emission
of pollutants. In what follows, we consider only rules that are linear
in output: T (S; q
i
) = (S)q
i
; in other words, we restrict attention to
stationary Markov tax rules that are linear in output. These are called
10
It may be optimal to treat equals unequally. See Long and Soubeyran (1997). In
the present paper we impose the requirement that equals must be treated equally, to
reect the fact that in many societies, discrimination is illegal.
7
linear Markov (LM) tax rules. We could have dealt with a more general
class of tax rules. For example, a tax rule could state the tax rate as
function of the calendar time, which would permit us to look at the case
where the government can precommit to a time path of non-constant
tax rate. In fact, Bergstrom, Cross, and Porter (1981), in dealing with
eciency-inducing tax for a monopolist mining rm, assume that the
per unit tax rate  is a function of time alone. However, as pointed
out by Karp and Livernois (1992), if the government cannot precommit
to its announced time path of tax rate, any tax rule that depends on
calendar time is subject to strategic manipulation by the monopolist (in
our case, the oligopolists) and will not achieve eciency. For this reason,
we restrict attention to tax rules that are independent of time.
Firm i's prot at time t is

i
(t) = P [q
i
(t) +Q
 i
(t)]q
i
(t)  [c+ (S(t))]q
i
(t) (19)
where Q
 i
(t) denotes the sum of the outputs of all other rms. We
assume that rms take a long view and therefore do not maximize short-
run prot. Each rm realizes that its output at t will add to the pollution
stock, and thus aect its future tax liability. Firm i's objective function
is to maximize its long-run prot, dened as the value 
i
of the stream
of discounted short-run prots:

i
=
Z
1
0

i
(t) e
 rt
dt (20)
We seek to characterize the Nash equilibria of the game for a given
tax rule, and then nd the optimum tax rule. As one would expect, this
depends on the type of Nash equilibrium under consideration. In the
next two sections, we examine two types of equilibrium: open-loop Nash
equilibrium (OLNE) and Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE).
3 Corrective Tax in an Open-loop Nash Equi-
librium
In the open-loop formulation, the strategy space for each rm is the set of
all possible time paths of its output, and each rm must choose right at
the beginning of the game (at t = 0) its entire time path q
i
(:). An open-
loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) for the industry is a set of chosen time
paths, q
1
(:); :::; q
n
(:), such that each rm's chosen time path maximizes
its long-run prot, given the time paths chosen by other rms. Any rm
can at any time t > 0 revise its time path, but whenever it contemplates
8
a revision, it continues to assume that all other rms will stick to their
originally chosen time paths q
j
(:), j 6= i. In the literature on open-loop
Nash equilibrium, it has been proved that along the equilibrium play,
at no time a rm can gain by departing from its initial plan. In other
words, open-loop Nash equilibria are time-consistent. (See Karp and
Newbery (1993) for a discussion of the time-consistency issue.)
In what follows, we describe the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the
pollution game. At time t = 0, the government announces the per unit
tax rule (S) that is applicable to all rms, at all time. By denition, in
an OLNE each rm has the correct forecast of the time paths of output
of all other rms. Firm i's chosen time path must be the solution of the
following optimal control problem
max
Z
1
0
fP (Q
 i
+ q
i
)  c  (S)gq
i
e
 rt
dt
subject to
_
S = Q
 i
+ q
i
  S (21)
and q
i
 0, S(0) = S
0
. Here, Q
 i
(t) is taken as given.
Let 
i
be the shadow price of the pollution stock in rm i's optimal
control problem. The necessary conditions for an interior maximum are
(21) and
P   c+ q
i
P
0
  (S) =  
i
(22)
_

i
= 
i
(r + ) + q
i

0
(23)
The transversality condition is
lim
t!1
e
 rt

i
(t)S(t) = 0
We will consider only symmetric equilibria, where all rms behave
identically. Obviously if the tax function is independent of S (
0
is zero
identically, and hence  = k a constant), then no rm will care about
the pollution stock and hence 
i
= 0; in this case we obtain the usual
static oligopolistic equilibrium, and the industry output is a constant
over time. If  = 0 identically then Q(t) = Q where
P (Q) + (Q=n)P
0
(Q) = c (24)
We call Q the laissez-faire level of output. If the per unit tax rate does
depend on S then  is non-zero. From (22) and (23):
P
0
n
[n+ 1 R]
_
Q = [P   c   +
Q
n
P
0
](r + ) + [
_
S  
Q
n
]
0
(25)
9
where R   QP
00
=P
0
is the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve,
which is assumed to be less than n+1; this assumption is a familiar sta-
bility condition in static oligopoly theory, see Dixit (1986), for example.
From (25) the steady state pollution stock in an OLNE, denoted by S
ol
1
,
must satisfy the following condition
P (S
ol
1
) = c+ 
 
S
ol
1

+

S
ol
1
n

"

0
 
S
ol
1

r + 
  P
0
(S
ol
1
)
#
(26)
Substituting Q =
_
S + S and
_
Q =

S + 
_
S into (25), we obtain a second
order dierential equation in S. We choose the solution that leads to
the steady state, that is the point (
_
S; S) = (0; S
ol
1
): The OLNE may be
represented by a pair of time paths for the stock S(t) and the output
Q(t), and we denote their steady state values by S
ol
1
and Q
ol
1
. In the
(S;Q) space, this pair (S(t); Q(t)) can be represented by a function Q =
Q
ol
(S) which may be called the `feedback representation' of the OLNE.
(See the appendix for an example of such a feedback representation.)
Our task is to design a tax rule (S) such that the socially optimum
time path of pollution can be \decentralized" as an OLNE of the dynamic
game played by the oligopolists. The following proposition characterizes
the optimal tax rule:
Proposition 1 (Optimal tax rule for OLNE: the general case)
Suppose that rms use open-loop strategies, and the government
wishes to design a tax rule that guides them to achieve the socially
optimal path
b
Q(S): The optimal tax rule (S) is the solution of the
following linear dierential equation
(S) +A(S)
0
(S) = B(S) (27)
with the boundary condition
P (
b
S
1
) = c+ 

b
S
1

+
"

b
S
1
n
#
2
4

0

b
S
1

r + 
  P
0
(
b
S
1
)
3
5
(28)
where
A(S) =
nS   (n  1)
b
Q(S)
n(r + )
and
B(S) = P   c 
c
Q
n
P
0
+
b
Q
0
(S)[
b
Q(S)  S](n+ 1  nR)P
0
n(r + )
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Proof
Recall that
b
Q(S) denotes the feedback control rule that achieves the
social optimum in the planning problem of Section 2. We want to nd
a tax rule b (S) such that the feedback representation of the OLNE is
identical to
b
Q(S). This is achieved if (i) the pair f
b
Q(S); b (S)g satisfy
equation (25) and (ii) b (
b
S
1
) satises the steady-state condition for an
OLNE, equation (28). Condition (i) means that the following equation
must be satised:
P
0
n
[n+ 1 R]
d
b
Q(S)
dt
= [P c (S)+
c
Q
n
P
0
](r+)+[
d
b
S
dt
 
c
Q
n
]
0
(S) (29)
where P = P (
b
Q(S)) , R = R(
b
Q(S)), and P
0
= P
0
(
b
Q(S)): Replacing
d
b
S=dt by
b
Q(S)   S and d
b
Q(S)=dt by
b
Q
0
(S)[
b
Q(S)   S ] in (29), we
obtain a rst order linear dierential equation in  as described in the
statement of Proposition 1. The dierential equation (27) has the general
solution
(S) = K exp
"
Z
S
0
 A(
e
S)d
e
S
#
+ 
p
(S) (30)
where 
p
(S) is a particular solution of (27), and K is a constant. This
constant is determined by the boundary condition (28).2
Proposition 2: (Optimal tax rule for OLNE: the linear-quadratic case).
Under linear demand and quadratic damage cost, the following tax
rule guides oligopolists to achieve the social optimum as an OLNE:
(S) = 

+ 

S (31)
where


=
(n+ 1)
n(r + 2) + (1  n)
 0 (32)
and


=
[n   b(r + )   (nr + n + )

]
b
S
1
n(r + )
(33)
where 

> 0 if  > 0;
@

@n
> 0 if  > 0;
@

@
> 0;
@

@r
< 0;
@

@
< 0,
and  can be positive or negative, and  is the negative root of equation
(17).
Proof : We want to show that the dierential equation (27) has a
solution of the form (S) =  + S. Substitute  + S for (S) in (27),
where
b
Q(S) is given by (16). Collect all terms that have S as a common
factor. Since the dierential equation must hold for all S  0, the sum
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of these terms must be zero. Thus we obtain the required expression for


, which is (32) above. (In obtaining this, we have also made use of
(17) for the relationship between  and .) Substitute this expression for


into the collection of terms not involving S. This gives (33). These
values also satisfy the boundary condition (28). It can be veried that
the necessary and sucient conditions for an OLNE are satised. To
obtain the partial derivative of 

, we rst substitute  into (32) to get


=
2
(2 + r) +
h
n 1
n+1
i
[(r + 2)
2
+ 4(=b)]
1=2
Remark: The tax rule (31) consists of two components: an `autonomous'
component 

that is independent of the pollution stock, and a `pollution-
induced' component, 

S.
It is natural that 

is positive if  > 0. The partial derivatives of 

reported in Proposition 2 also make sense. Thus, the more rms there
are, the greater is the tendency for each rm to ignore the eect of its
output on the indutry's future tax bill. To counter this incentive, we
have to increase 

, that is, a greater weight is given to S in the tax
function when n is large.
From Proposition 2, 

can be positive or negative, depending on
parameter values. To see this more clearly, re-write 

as


=

z(n)  
b(r + )
n

b
S
1
r + 
(34)
where
z(n) = 1 
2(r +  + (=n))
r + 2 +
h
n 1
n+1
i
[(r + 2)
2
+ 4=b]
1=2
(35)
In (34), the rst term , z(n), contains the damage parameter  while
the second term does not. Note that z(1) < 0 , and z (n) is a increasing
function, with lim
n!1
z(n) > 0: Therefore  < 0 if n is small (for
example n = 1); but for n suciently great, we have 

> 0. Again,
this accords with intuition: If there are just a few rms, then when
the stock of pollution is low, an output subsidy is optimal, because the
under-production due to market power outweighs the tendency for over-
production associated with negative externality. If there are many rms,
then it is never optimal to subsidize outputs.
A somewhat surprising result emerges: even in the case where the
laissez-faire output exceeds the socially optimal one at all point of time,
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it may still be optimal to pay rms a subsidy for some initial interval
of time, when the stock of pollution is low. (That is, (S) = 

+ 

S
is negative for S suciently small.) This subsidy, however, does not
induce rms to produce more than their laissez-faire output, because
they know that the greater is their output, the quicker is the rate at
which the subsidy falls, and if the stock of pollution becomes suciently
great,  will become positive, that is, the subsidy will turn into a tax.
In order to receive the subsidy, and to prolong the subsidized phase,
rms have an incentive to reduce output below the laissez-faire level.
We record this as a proposition.
Proposition 3 (A subsidy that reduces output)
If the damage parameter  is suciently great, then it can be optimal
to subsidize rms when the stock of pollution is small, even though their
laissez-faire output exceeeds the social optimum at all t. This subsidy
induces rms to reduce their output below the laissez-faire output.
Proof
It suces to consider the linear-quadratic case. The laissez-faire
output (that is, in the absence of tax or subsidy) is Q = na=[b(n+ 1)].
Since
b
Q(S) is decreasing in S, Q exceeds the social optimum output for
all value of S if and only if Q >
b
Q(S) at S = 0; that is, if and only if

2n
n+ 1

1 +

b(r + )

>

(r + 2)
2
+ 4(=b)

1=2
  r (36)
This is satied for  suciently great and both  and r are small. If
z(n) in (35) is negative (for example, if n =1) then (S) < 0 for small
S:2
4 Corrective Tax in a Markov Perfect Nash
Equilibrium
We now turn to the case where rms choose Markovian strategies rather
than open-loop strategies. A (stationary) Markovian strategy for a rm
is a decision rule that determines its output at time t as a function of
the observed size of the pollution stock at t: q
i
(t) = 
i
(S(t)). Under
these strategies rms are not committed at the outset to any given time
path of their outputs. A Markov perfect Nash equilibrium is a set of
decision rules 
1
(:); :::; 
n
(:) such that each rm's decision rule is the
best response to those of its opponents.
Suppose rm 1 knows that all other rms use Markovian strategies.
Then its optimal response 
i
(:) is the solution of an optimal control
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problem. Firm 1 knows that the actual outputs of its opponents at time
t depends (indirectly) on its output q
1
(t
0
) for all t
0
< t via its eect
on the stock S(t). Firm 1's optimal solution is then a function of the
decision rules of its opponents. Given these decision rules, the solution
of rm 1's optimal control problem determines its output at any time t
as a function of S(t). We denote this function as q
1
(t) = 
1
(S(t)). The
function 
1
(S) is thus a stationary Markovian strategy.
As in Section 3, we assume that the government announces at time
t = 0 a tax rule. For simplicity, we will consider only a per unit tax that
depends only on S:  = (S). Let
Q
 i
(S) =
X
j 6=i

j
(S)
Firm i's optimal control problem is
max
Z
1
0

i
(t)e
 rt
dt
where

i
(t) = P [Q
 i
(S) + q
i
] q
i
  [c+ (S)] q
i
The constraints are
_
S = Q
 i
(S) + q
i
  S (37)
and q
i
 0, S(0) = S
0
. The Hamiltonian is
H = P [Q
 i
(S) + q
i
] q
i
  [c+ (S)] q
i
+ 
i
[Q
 i
(S) + q
i
  S] (38)
Restricting attention to interior solutions, we obtain the following nec-
essary conditions for this optimal control problem:
P + q
i
P
0
  c  (S) =  
i
(39)
_

i
= 
i
h
r +   Q
0
 i
(S)
i
+ q
i

0
(S)  q
i
P
0
Q
0
 i
(S) (40)
We now seek to characterize symmetric MPNE, where for all j; q
j
=
(S). Substitute this into (39), and dierentiate the resulting expression
with respect to t :
[(n+ 1)P
0
(n(S)) + nP
00
]
0
(S)
_
S   
0
(S)
_
S =  
_
 (41)
Combining this equation with (40), we obtain a dierential equation in

[
0
(S) ((S))   
0
(S)] [n(S)  S] =  [(S); (S); 
0
(S); 
0
(S)] (42)
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where
 [(S)]  (n+ 1)P
0
(n(S)) + n(S)P
00
(n(S))
and
  [P + (S)P
0
  c  (S)][r +    (n  1)
0
] + (S)[(n  1)P
0

0
  
0
]
Given the tax rule  , a symmetric MPNE that admits a steady-
state is a solution to the dierential equation (42) with the `boundary
condition'
n(S
1
)  S
1
= 0 (43)
where S
1
is unspecied. We are interested in a MPNE that gives rise
to a converging time path of S. The following proposition shows that
such a MPNE can be easily computed in a special case.
Proposition 4 : Assume linear demand and quadratic damage cost. If
the tax rule is linear, (S) =  + S, where  > 0, then there exists
a unique symmetric MPNE in linear strategies, (S) = g   hS , with
g > 0; h > 0;that ensure the convergence of S(t) to a steady state.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark: Since best replies to linear strategies are linear, we are not
imposing the requirement that, in responding to the linear strategies of
its rivals, a rm is restricted to the set of linear strategies.
Proposition 5 :(Optimal tax rule for MPNE : the general case) Under
general (non-linear) demand and damage function, a tax rule that guides
the rms to achieve the social optimum path as a symmetric MPNE is
the solution of the following linear dierential equation:
(S) +E(S)
0
(S) = F (S) (44)
with the boundary condition
h
P (
b
Q
1
)  c  (
b
S
1
)
i
=
h

0
(
b
S
1
)  (r + )P
0
(
b
Q
1
)
i
b
Q
1
h
n(r + )  (n  1)
b
Q
0
(
b
S
1
)
i
(45)
where
E(S) 
nS   (n  1)
b
Q(S)
n(r + )  (n  1)
b
Q
0
(S)
(46)
and
F (S)  P   c+
1
n
b
QP
0
  P
0
c
Q
0
"
(n+ 1 R)(
b
Q  S) 
n 1
n
b
Q
n(r + )  (n  1)
b
Q
0
(S)
#
(47)
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Proof: Omitted. The method is similar to that used in the proof of
Proposition 1.
Proposition 6 :(Optimal tax rule for MPNE: the linear-quadratic case)
For the linear-quadratic case, the optimal tax that guides rms to achieve
the social optimum path as a MPNE is
(S) = 

+ 

S (48)
where


=
(n+ 1) + (n  1)b
2
n(r + 2)  2(n  1)
> 0 (49)
and


=


r + 
 
b(r + ) + (nr + n +  + n  )

n(r + )  (n  1)

b
S
1
(50)
Remark
It can be veried that if n > 1 then 

< 

of the open loop case.
The proof consists of showing that 

is decreasing in n for n > 1, and
noting that if n = 1 then 

= 

: On the other hand, one can show
that 

 

, with equality holding only if n = 1. These results are
intuitively plausible. If there is only one rm, (n = 1), then OLNE is the
same as MPNE. If n  2, then in an OLNE each rm thinks its rivals
will not react to any increase in pollution caused by its increased output.
That explains why the government must set 

at a value greater than
its MPNE counterpart 

.
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that one can nd a tax rule that guides oligopolists
to achieve the socially optimal time path of pollution. The tax rule is
time-independent and therefore does not give rise to dynamic inconsis-
tency. At low pollution levels, the tax can be negative, even when the
laissez-faire output exceeds the optimal output at each point in time. In
such cases, the rms receiving the subsidy actually have an incentive to
produce less than the laissez-faire output. This is because they want to
delay the time when the subsidy automatically turns into a tax.
In the case of linear demand and quadratic damage cost, the optimal
tax rule turns out to be very simple, and intuitively appealing. It is
linear in the pollution stock, and contains only two components, an
\autonomous" one which is independent of the pollution stock, and a
\pollution-induced" component. It may be argued that if the economy
16
is near an optimal steady state, then the linear- quadratic case is a good
approximation,
In our formulation, to facilitate comparison of our model with the
intertemporal models of Bergstrom et al. (1981) and Karp and Livernois
(1992), we have assumed that the marginal cost of public fund is unity.
An obvious extension would be to allow this cost to exceed unity. A
more dicult task would be to introduce asymmetry of information into
our intertemporal framework. This is part of our research agenda.
A Appendix
Open-loop Nash equilibrium : the linear-quadratic case
Take any arbitrary pair (; ) with   0, and let (S) =  + S:
Substituting this into (25) and writing Q =
_
S + S and
_
Q =

S + 
_
S
, we obtain a second order dierential equation in S. This yields the
characteristic equation 
2
+E + F = 0 where
E =  r +
(n  1)
(n+ 1)b
and
F =  (r + ) 

b

 +
rn
n+ 1

We choose the negative root, denoted by 
ol
, to obtain the solution that
leads to the steady state, that is the point (
_
S; S) = (0; S
ol
1
): The steady
state pollution stock is
S
ol
1
=
a  
b(1 +
1
n
) + (1 +

n(r+)
)
(51)
and the equilibrium evolution of S is
S(t) = S
ol
1
+ (S
0
  S
ol
1
) exp(
ol
t) (52)
Since Q =
_
S + S, the equilibrium strategy for rm i is
q
i
(t) =
1
n

S
ol
1
+ ( + 
ol
)(S
0
  S
ol
1
) exp(
ol
t)

(53)
where (+
ol
) < 0. The feedback representation of the OLNE is obtained
from (52) and (53):
Q(S) Q
ol
1
= ( + 
ol
)(S   S
ol
1
) (54)
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Markov-Perfect Nash equilibrium : the linear-quadratic case
Using the \undetermined coecient technique" (see Ferhstman and
Kamien (1987), Dockner and Long (1994)) we obtain a unique MPNE in
linear strategies that ensure convergence to a steady state. The method
is outlined below.
Given the tax rule (S) = +S, where  > 0, and a  > 0, let us
suppose that rm i assumes that all other rms use a linear Markovian
strategy q
j
(S) = X + Y S. (Since  > 0, we expect Y to be negative in
a symmetric MPNE; this will be conrmed later.) Firm i's prot is

i
= [a  b (q
i
+ (n  1)(X + Y S))] q
i
  ( + S)q
i
(55)
Let V
i
(S) be rm i's value function. The Bellman equation is
rV
i
(S) = max
q
i
[
i
+ V
0
i
(S) (q
i
+ (n  1)(X + Y S)  S)] (56)
Try V
i
(S) =
1
2
AS
2
+ BS + C, where A;B and C are to be determined.
Maximizing the right-hand side of (56) with respect to q
i
yields
a     S   b(n  1)(X + Y S)  2bq
i
+AS +B = 0 (57)
In a symmetric equilibrium, q
i
= q
j
= X+Y S. Substitute this into (57)
to obtain
Y =
A  
b(n+ 1)
; X =
a   +B
b(n+ 1)
(58)
Substitute (58) into (56) to obtain an identity which holds for all S.
Collecting the terms that have S
2
as a common factor, we obtain a
quadratic equation in A
2n
2
A
2
  [2(1 + n
2
) + b(n+ 1)
2
(2 + r)]A + 2
2
= 0 (59)
This equation has two real roots
A
1;2
=
1
4n
2

2(1 + n
2
) + b(r + 2)(1 + n)
2

q
Z + [b(r + 2)(1 + n)
2
]
2

where
Z = 4
2
(n
2
  1)
2
+ 4(1 + n
2
)b(n+ 1)
2
(r + 2) > 0
It can be shown that the smaller root, say A
1
, is smaller than . This is
the one we select to ensure that Y < 0 (and that B < 0; and a +B > 0,
see below).
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Next, collecting the terms that have S as a common factor, we obtain
a linear equation in B, which gives
B =
(a  )

(n
2
+ 1)A
1
  2

b(r + )(n+ 1)
2
+ (1 + n
2
)  2n
2
A
1
< 0
(It can be shown that denominator of B is positive and the numerator
of B is negative.)
Having found A and B; we obtain the equation
_
S = nX   nY S   S =
n [a   +B]
(n+ 1)b
+ 
M
S
where

M


  +
n(A
1
  )
(n+ 1)b

< 0
and it can be veried that a    + B > 0.The steady state stock of
pollution in a MPNE, denoted by S
M
1
, is:
S
M
1
=
n [a   +B]
[ b(n+ 1)
M
]
> 0
The equilibrium Markov-perfect strategy is
q
i
(S) =
1
n
S
M
1
+
1
n
( + 
M
)(S   S
M
1
)
This gives rise to the equilibrium industry output
Q(S)  S
M
1
= ( + 
M
)(S   S
M
1
)
This is readily comparable with the feedback representation of the OLNE
given by (54).2
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